Divorce Lawyers Dallas

The granting of fees in a divorce case is proper when there is a showing of the financial inability of one party to pay the fees and the ability of the other to do so; however, financial inability is not equated with destitution, and the fact that the party seeking the fees would be stripped of his or her financial resources if required to pay is sufficient to support the award of fees.
An award of attorney fees requires consideration of the financial resources of the parties, and is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, reversible only for an abuse of discretion.
An award of attorney fees is justified when the party seeking relief demonstrates financial inability to pay coupled with the ability of the former spouse to do so.
Evidence was sufficient to establish wife’s financial inability to pay the full amount expended in attorney fees, as well as husband’s ability to do so.
Where parties’ earnings were substantially equal, and where petitioner received substantial cash award while respondent was left with relatively no liquid assets, petitioner had not shown an inability to pay her own attorney fees.
The criteria for determining whose obligations the attorney fees will be in a divorce action is similar to the criteria for determining whether a spouse is entitled to alimony; the court must consider the financial resources of the parties.
The circuit court’s order requiring defendant to pay a portion of the attorney fees incurred by plaintiff was in error where plaintiff could pay for her own attorney without undermining her economic stability.
Considering the relative financial resources of the parties, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence that respondent had to pay petitioner attorney’s fees for defense of the cross appeal where petitioner owned stock worth $1,500, had funds in bank accounts totaling $220, had no regular income from employment, was receiving $900 per month from respondent, and had to borrow money for her living expenses.
Where an attorney seeks fees from his own client pursuant to subsection (a) the purpose of the proceeding is not to enable the less affluent spouse to maintain or defend the action but is directed to promoting judicial economy by eliminating the former requirement that an attorney bring a separate suit for such fees against his own client; regardless of the respective financial circumstances of the spouses, an attorney is still entitled to seek payment for his services from his own client and the legislature in providing this procedure did not intend that it be conditioned upon the financial abilities of the parties.
The lack of evidence concerning the relative financial position of parties required remand for a hearing to determine the financial ability of the parties and the determination of the question of attorney fees.
Although respondent’s income was rather inadequate to his obligations, the petitioner was not able to pay attorney fees since she was unable to work consistently because of the demands of the minor children; the resources of the husband were limited, but the court’s order requiring respondent to pay attorney fees was the only practical disposition possible.
The court may order either spouse to pay the costs and fees incurred by the other party in any proceeding after considering the financial resources of the parties; no other considerations are mandated.
Before one spouse may recover attorney fees from the other, the former must prove that he or she is unable to pay the fees and that the opposing party does have such ability.
After considering the financial resources of the parties, the court properly ordered that petitioner and respondent would be responsible for their own attorney fees.
Although attorney fees may be awarded in connection with the defense of a proceeding under this Act, the criterion for assessing fees is the relative financial resources of the parties.
 

See Also:  Divorce Lawyers Las Vegas

As you consider your divorce settlement, you may be tempted to sign it just to get things over and done with.  This is a bad mistake.  Even if everything looks fair and equitable, you may not really be getting a good deal.  Below is an article by By William Donaldson, that outlines some major areas to consider in your divorce settlement.

Divorce Settlement Mistakes

High-profile personal injury lawyer Terry Crouppen and his former wife, Carol, are back in the Missouri Court of Appeals, whether they like it or not.

And it’s all about that word “whether.”

In Mr. Crouppen’s appellant brief is a two-page-plus definition of the word and its usage, given as testimony during divorce proceedings by expert witness Bryan Garner, head of LawProse Inc. in Dallas, and editor in chief of Black’s Law Dictionary.

Link

The doctrine of laches would not be applied where there was no injury or prejudice to the adverse party and where there was no change in the situation of the parties dues to the delay to the detriment of the adverse party, and the defendant would not be prejudiced or injured by merely requiring him to pay child support that he had owed for a number of years.

The court did not abuse its discretion in making an increase in child support retroactive to the date the petition was filed, notwithstanding the assertion that the petitioner’s delay in responding to discovery slowed the proceedings, where the respondent did not explain how this prejudiced him and did not contend that he did not receive notice of the petition within a short time after it was filed.
With regard to the notice date for purposes of calculating the support amount subject to retroactive abatement, the husband’s voluntary dismissal of his first motion to modify was not properly vacated and, therefore, the date of the husband’s second motion to modify was the date to which his support obligation could be retroactively abated.
The circuit court erred in requiring the respondent to pay retroactive child support and interest between the date of the judgment of dissolution and when the petition for modification was filed.
Under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, retroactive modification of child support orders is not permitted.
Although subsection (a) prohibits retroactive modification of an existing order of support, where the trial court determined that no order directing any payment was in existence at the time of the court’s finding because the original agreement had expired, no order was in existence to be modified by the trial court and no violation of subsection (a) occurred upon the court’s order for retroactive child support.
Any modification allowed by the court of a child support agreement will only act prospectively.
The question of whether modification should be retroactive is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
There was no basis on which to conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it denied retroactive support where husband caused no delays in the court’s hearing wife’s petition to modify child support, and the court did hear that petition in a timely fashion, and where wife had petitioned the court in 1987 and 1988 for an increase in support based on the same allegations in her 1989 petition, but failed to pursue those claims.
There was no breach of discretion in the order of the trial court refusing to make a modification order retroactive.
Whether a modification is to be retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition, or any time after, is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.
Where under the original divorce decree wife was responsible for all medical expenses, and a 1964 modification of the divorce decree requiring the husband to pay medical bills applied only to medical expenses which would be incurred in the future, the trial court erred in assessing husband for one-half of a 1963 medical bill.

In determining whether maintenance should be modified, the court properly considered that respondent no longer owned a home and had been awarded only 15% of petitioner’s pension.
It is not only just and equitable to consider the factors listed in subsection (c), but also it is statutorily required when awarding maintenance pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/504.
The factors to be considered in making an award of maintenance under subsection (b) of 750 ILCS 5/504 are applicable to modification proceedings under subsection (a) of this section.
In determining whether to modify maintenance and to what degree, the trial court is to consider the same factors as those for making the initial award: the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to her; the standard of living established during the marriage; the duration of the marriage; the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties; the ability of the spouse seeking maintenance to meet her needs independently; and the ability of the other spouse to pay.

The one time receipt of money from a lump-sum payment of worker’s compensation settlement comes within the parameters of net income as defined in 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3), and was available for allocation as child support pursuant to this section.

The term “conjugal” as used in subsection (c) of this section does not necessarily require that the parties engage in sexual intercourse or sexual conduct.
The legislature did not intend the term “conjugal” to be defined as familial rather than marital.
By “conjugal” the legislature meant a relationship of a husband and wife nature, including its sexual aspects.

Also See Philadelphia Divorce Lawyers

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to terminate maintenance but extended it at a reduced level in light of each party’s change of circumstances.
The uncontroverted evidence presented clearly showed that the average monthly cost of raising the children had risen dramatically average monthly cost of raising the children had risen dramatically where, even after removing the items that husband considered luxuries, i.e., allowing the children to attend summer camp, son’s involvement in band and daughter’s involvement in gymnastics, the increase was shown to be about $450 a month; since this was a substantial change, the trial court erred in determining that no change of circumstances had occurred.

Where a defendant filed a judicial admission of his ability to pay, but never attempted to put his financial condition in issue until after a judgment was rendered, the defendant could not assert as a substantial change in circumstances any change in his financial condition which occurred before the judgment, because the defendant never asserted before that date that the admission did not represent his then current financial condition.
A trial court was in error in decreeing that plaintiff’s right to receive support payments from the defendant was strictly limited to the net rentals from their business property, and limiting a testimony at a hearing on the petition for increase of payments for support and maintenance to the question of net rentals from the business property, in refusing to hear any evidence as to any change in circumstances and conditions since the entry of the original divorce decree, and in limiting and restricting the payment of a certain amount per month which was ordered to the net rentals received from the business property and ordering that payments terminate on the sale of property.