Divorce Lawyers Dallas

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to terminate maintenance but extended it at a reduced level in light of each party’s change of circumstances.
The uncontroverted evidence presented clearly showed that the average monthly cost of raising the children had risen dramatically average monthly cost of raising the children had risen dramatically where, even after removing the items that husband considered luxuries, i.e., allowing the children to attend summer camp, son’s involvement in band and daughter’s involvement in gymnastics, the increase was shown to be about $450 a month; since this was a substantial change, the trial court erred in determining that no change of circumstances had occurred.

Where a defendant filed a judicial admission of his ability to pay, but never attempted to put his financial condition in issue until after a judgment was rendered, the defendant could not assert as a substantial change in circumstances any change in his financial condition which occurred before the judgment, because the defendant never asserted before that date that the admission did not represent his then current financial condition.
A trial court was in error in decreeing that plaintiff’s right to receive support payments from the defendant was strictly limited to the net rentals from their business property, and limiting a testimony at a hearing on the petition for increase of payments for support and maintenance to the question of net rentals from the business property, in refusing to hear any evidence as to any change in circumstances and conditions since the entry of the original divorce decree, and in limiting and restricting the payment of a certain amount per month which was ordered to the net rentals received from the business property and ordering that payments terminate on the sale of property.

Father’s change in employment status, which yielded a 130 percent increase in the father’s weekly income, was sufficient to support a petition for modification of the father’s support obligation under 750 ILCS 5/510(a) and required application of the support guidelines found in 750 ILCS 5/50.
Where a trial court’s decision reducing child support is based on a finding of an obligor’s good-faith voluntary change of employment, on appeal the party opposing the motion may attack either the finding the obligor acted in good faith in changing employment or that such a change justified a reduction in child support.
Whether respondent’s conduct leading to the loss of his employment constituted acts of commission or omission, the evidence was deliberate and his discharge was not merely a fortuitous occurrence; under these circumstances, the trial court could properly view his change of employment as “voluntary” and the record supported the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in denying respondent’s petition to modify his support obligation.
If the trial court, upon allowing a petition for modification under this section, finds that a spouse receiving maintenance is appropriately employed, it may reduce maintenance commensurate with her ability to gain financial independence; on the other hand, if the spouse receiving maintenance is able to work but unwilling to obtain appropriate employment and is not making a good faith effort to gain financial independence, it may reduce or discontinue maintenance. Conversely, if the court finds that there is a good reason for her inability to achieve full or partial financial independence, it may continue such maintenance and extend its duration.
If the employment change is voluntary, the change in employment must be made in good faith and not prompted by a desire to avoid one’s child support obligation for modification to be allowed.
Child support payments should be reduced where substantial economic reversals result from an involuntary change or loss of employment.
A good faith, voluntary change in employment which results in reduced financial ability can constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction in child support obligation by the court; the test for determining if a decision was made in good faith is whether the change was prompted by a desire to evade financial responsibility for supporting the children or to otherwise jeopardize their interests.
Where the record supported a determination that respondent’s decision to return to college and reduce the hours of his employment was made in good faith and not out of a desire to evade his financial responsibilities, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a reduction in his child support payments.
Good faith in a spouse’s voluntary change of employment is not shown where it can be determined that the change has been prompted by a desire to evade financial responsibilities to the supported spouse.
A voluntary, good faith change in employment need not equal or increase the spouse’s income; indeed, substantial reductions may be permissible and do not per se constitute lack of good faith.
Unless good faith is shown, a voluntary termination of employment by a supporting spouse is not considered a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant abatement or modification of support obligations.
The crucial consideration in determining whether or not voluntary termination of employment by a supporting spouse is sufficient to warrant abatement or modification of support obligations is whether the change in status was prompted by a desire to evade responsibility.
It was within the discretion of the trial court to abate the child support payments on the uncontradicted testimony of the father that he was discharged from his employment and had no other income.

A “substantial change in circumstances” may not be founded on changes in financial conditions contemplated by the judgment for dissolution of marriage.
Changed conditions are necessary to warrant a change in support payments.
When a material change has occurred, creating an imbalance between the child’s needs and the parent’s support capabilities, the act requires modification.
Maintenance and child support are continuing obligations subject to change as the conditions and circumstances of the parties warrant.
Upon application for a modification of support, the court’s paramount consideration is whether a substantial and material change in circumstances has occurred since entry of the decree which would authorize the court to change the allowance.
Subsection (a) of this section allows the provisions of a judgment respecting support to be modified only upon a showing of substantial change in circumstances. What “change in circumstances” is required is left to the interpretation of the courts. That interpretation should be guided by the basic premise that the court should act in such manner as to serve the best interests of the children while giving du consideration to the rights and interests of the parents.
A party may not unilaterally terminate child support payments when there is a change in circumstances.
Under former Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 40, 19, reasonable and proper alterations in support were those necessitated when the conditions and circumstances of the parties had materially changed subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree.
Although this Act does not specify the conditions on which alimony may be terminated or modified, it has been construed to allow modification of an award upon a showing of substantial change in the circumstances of the parties.
In all cases where petitions to modify payments under a divorce decree are involved, the primary question is whether or not changes in circumstances of the parties justify the modification.
The issue on a petition for modification of child support payments is whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the entry of the original decree.
Before an order for support payments can be modified there must be a finding of changed circumstances which relate either to the needs of the children or the financial condition of the parents.
The court may not arbitrarily or capriciously modify the provisions for alimony or child support but can do so after a substantial change is show to have occurred and the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show such material changes in circumstances as would justify modification.
The issue on a petition for modification of child support payments is whether there has been a material change of circumstances of the parties since the entry of the decree.
Under former section 19 of the Divorce Act, the issue in a hearing on a petition to modify a divorce decree to require the former husband to pay an increased amount for support of the children of the parties, is whether there have been material changes in the circumstances of the parties since the entry of the divorce decree; an increase in monthly support payments is warranted when the evidence establishes that the needs of the children have increased, and the means of the supporting parent have also increased so as to enable him to contribute additional sums to his children’s support.
On a petition for modification the inquiry is necessarily directed to the question whether there have been material changes in the circumstances of the parties since the entry of the original decree; if petitioner’s wants and necessities have increased and the means of the defendant is shown to have grown so as to enable him to contribute to such increased needs, then an additional allowance is proper.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013, the bankruptcy court’s calculation of the value of the marital estate, pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/503(f), was not clearly erroneous, the bankruptcy court’s measure of the date regarding the debtor’s dissipation claim and the specific calculation of the value of the dissipation claim was not clearly erroneous, and the debtor’s collateral estoppel argument failed.
The trial court’s valuation of a corporation was against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was below the valuation the respondent paid to shareholder’s widow four years earlier and evidence showed the corporation’s financial healthy had greatly improved since the earlier transaction.
Returning petitioner’s share of couple’s initial investment to her six years later, as if nothing had happened in the intervening period of time, was necessarily arbitrary, particularly when only testimony on financial health of company suggested it had financial problems.
For a case discussing valuation methodology used in assessing business assets.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to take into account the entire value of the medical practice when the trial court failed to include all of the elements of the purchase agreement and consultation agreement between the husband and a third party.
Where court should have considered the effort that the spouse expended on his surgical practice in determining the excess earnings of his practice, because he worked from 50 to 70 hours a week, he may have had a significantly greater income than a hypothetical employee who regularly worked a 40 hour week, but that increased income may have been due solely to longer hours and greater productivity, the court’s failure to take these factors into account resulted in an artificially inflated valuation of the spouse’s medical corporation and constituted an abuse of discretion, and the court’s valuation was reversed and remanded for a reconsideration of the value of the spouse’s practice.