Divorce Lawyers Dallas

Where the parties to a settlement agreement intend to limit the automatic termination of certain terms, they must do so in clear language.
Where the parties entered an agreement which provided for the termination of maintenance payments only upon wife’s death or remarriage or at the end of ten years, the parties did not intend to conclude that cohabitation was a condition for termination of maintenance under the settlement agreement.
As of the effective date of this Act, parties were allowed to enter into written separation agreements in accordance with 750 ILCS 5/502 which extended maintenance beyond the terminating events of subsection (b).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to terminate maintenance by former husband to former wife completely where the parties had agreed to the amount in a contractual agreement prior to the divorce.

In determining whether maintenance should be modified, the court properly considered that respondent no longer owned a home and had been awarded only 15% of petitioner’s pension.
It is not only just and equitable to consider the factors listed in subsection (c), but also it is statutorily required when awarding maintenance pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/504.
The factors to be considered in making an award of maintenance under subsection (b) of 750 ILCS 5/504 are applicable to modification proceedings under subsection (a) of this section.
In determining whether to modify maintenance and to what degree, the trial court is to consider the same factors as those for making the initial award: the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to her; the standard of living established during the marriage; the duration of the marriage; the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties; the ability of the spouse seeking maintenance to meet her needs independently; and the ability of the other spouse to pay.

The one time receipt of money from a lump-sum payment of worker’s compensation settlement comes within the parameters of net income as defined in 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3), and was available for allocation as child support pursuant to this section.

The term “conjugal” as used in subsection (c) of this section does not necessarily require that the parties engage in sexual intercourse or sexual conduct.
The legislature did not intend the term “conjugal” to be defined as familial rather than marital.
By “conjugal” the legislature meant a relationship of a husband and wife nature, including its sexual aspects.

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Trial court did not err in granting the mother’s petition to increase child support, as the mother showed both that the father had an increased ability to pay and that the child’s needs had increased since the original support order was entered three years earlier.
A substantial change in circumstances was shown, and the case reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order to abate maintenance retroactive to filing of the petition to modify.
Father’s obligation to pay a portion of one son’s college expenses had ended and thus he no longer had any financial obligation to this son; this change in circumstances was sufficient to justify the trial court’s order providing for a pro rata reduction in the life insurance obligation.
Generally, evidence that a child has attained the age of majority constitutes a substantial change in circumstances which necessitates the modification of child support unless: (1) the parties agree on a different terminating event; (2) the court orders support payments to continue based on the non-minor child’s physical or mental disability or when educational expenses are sought; or (3) the child becomes emancipated at an earlier age.
Where the husband’s business entered bankruptcy and there was no evidence that he voluntarily chose to have his business fail, there was a substantial change in his circumstances that would warrant a reduction or modification of his support obligation.
Inheritances received by wife constituted a substantial change in her circumstances, and the court failed to make any determination of the amount of income which could be generated therefrom, and some approximation of the income-producing ability of the inheritances was required, explicit findings by the trial court are not required so long as a sufficiently detailed basis exists in the record to support a modification of the award.
The trial court appropriately balanced the needs of the child with the significant increase in petitioner’s income and did not abuse its discretion in awarding child support where it determined that the child’s expenses increased after he entered high school, and that the father’s income grew substantially after winning the lottery.
Where three of the four children had attained the age of majority, the remaining minor child was older and expenses of her maintenance had increased, a substantial change of circumstances occurred thereby justifying a modification of child support payments.
Where at the time of the divorce, defendant’s gross income was approximately $12,800 and then became around $21,000, where the total increase was about 64% and where the increased needs of the child could be presumed from the fact that he had grown older and the cost of living had risen the trial court was correct in finding a substantial change of circumstances had occurred.
If the parties cannot agree upon child support after cessation of the unallocated support provided in the decree, such cessation would present a substantial change in circumstances which would permit modification of the judgment for dissolution upon petition of a party and support for the minor child will then be determined by the court.
There was a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the previous judgment because the children’s needs increased and the defendant’s ability to support his children had increased significantly.
Plaintiff’s real needs had increased and also the defendant’s real income and ability to pay where defendant’s annual income had risen by more than $12,000, and he had gained interest in an inheritance and a residential building and such a substantial change in circumstances warranted modification.
Substantial changes in circumstances including the emancipation of the couple’s only child and the sufficiency of former wife’s own assets and income to meet her needs, considered in light of former wife’s request that former husband now contribute toward meeting the cost of the son’s college education, warranted a modification of a maintenance award ordered by the court.
A reduction in child support is proper only if based on a substantial change in circumstances; in fact that three of the six children order was such a substantial change in circumstances; as a result, weekly child support payments from $125 to $100.
In light of divorced wife’s increase in salary and her former husband’s decrease in salary due to health problems, there was a sufficient showing of a change in circumstances whereby the divorce decree could be modified to suspend alimony and reduce child support.
An order of a trial court continuing the liability of the father for support for educational purposes was against the manifest weight of the evidence and was reversed where the trial court found that he had suffered substantial economic reverses, there was no evidence that his circumstances had improved since the suspension of prospects for future employment, that could not be translated into a present ability to pay, he clearly had no present resources from which to pay educational expenses, and his liability to pay $40 per week for his minor, physically afflicted son would preclude his ability to make any payments for education for his older son.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying a father’s request to require a non-custodian mother to contribute an equitable amount in the support of their minor child where its decision failed to consider the circumstances of all the parties as required by former Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 40, para. 18, particularly that the mother was earning more than the father and, there had been custody change from the home of the mother to the home of the father.
There was a sufficient showing of change of circumstances to warrant a modification of the amount of payments.
The trial court, which conducted a long hearing, had ample justification to conclude from the evidence, that there was a change in circumstances such as would justify a modification of the divorce decree reducing the weekly child support payments.
There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its modification order when it determined that the financial condition of the defendant had sufficiently changed since the entry of the divorce decree so as to warrant its modification.